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Al Kudsi 1 
Valuable Indulgence: A Response to 
Schopenhauer and Social Pessimism 
Arthur Schopenhauer argues that social interaction is inherently a negative influence 
on the general population. Schopenhauer, a philosophical pessimist, views the masses as vulgar 
and incapable of experiencing happiness in the long term, citing people’s endless cycle of 
desires, and the infeasibility of satisfying those desires, as driving continuous suffering. He 
claims that in order to form a friendship, all parties involved must be of a similar level of 
intellect, and that the majority of people are indistinct, lacking exceptional judgment. 
Additionally, he contends that friendship hinders people’s intellectual growth and obstructs 
true self-reflection, and should therefore be avoided. This paper will serve to evaluate that 
premise, drawing on Cicero’s discourse on friendship’s essence and emotional value to refute 
Schopenhauer’s views.  
Schopenhauer asserts that one should abstain from social discourse, as it requires 
leveling down to the lowest common denominator. He prefaces this argument by stating that 
humans view others as they view themselves. This theory contends that the intellectual benefit 
and utility one gains from engaging with someone else is entirely contingent on one’s 
intellectual value. He claims that, “You cannot see in another man any more than you have in 
yourself; and your own intelligence strictly determines the extent to which he comes within its 
grasp” (Schopenhauer: 25). Through this assertion, Schopenhauer is claiming that no matter 
the level of intelligence one has developed for oneself, one is incapable of advancing one’s 
knowledge through others. Additionally, the philosopher’s pessimism on life’s worth extends 
to the people he surrounds himself with, as he considers the majority of the population as 
inherently distasteful and intellectually sub-par. He urges readers to, “Consider how sordid, 
how stupid, in a word, how vulgar most men are, and you will see that it is impossible to talk to 
them without becoming vulgar yourself for the time being” (25). Following along with his 
equation, the majority of men are vulgar and not worth conversing with, and it is highly likely 
that their shortcomings will influence their friends, hindering their intellectual capacity. 
According to his prior claim that friendship necessitates similar levels of intelligence, one 
cannot benefit from engaging with someone any more than his own intellectual value. 
Therefore, friendship and social discourse are counterproductive to one’s development, and 
degrades one’s own intellectual value. This claim attacks the essence of mutual benefit and 
friendship, and leads Schopenhauer to conclude that it is more beneficial to isolate oneself to 
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foster personal development, instead of dumbing down oneself to society’s standard of inferior 
discourse.  
Moreover, Schopenhauer goes on to conclude that engaging in social discourse is a 
natural obstruction to authentic self-reflection. He contends that friendship and sociality 
involve sacrifice. In order to partake in conversation and friendship with others, one must 
exercise  “mutual accommodation and restraint upon the part of its members” (Schopenhauer: 
14). One must constrain and ultimately alter one’s true self in order to subvert the natural 
differences in opinion and disposition that fosters aggression between people. This leads to the 
shaping of one’s opinions around the mutual interests of this interaction. Schopenhauer 
claims that this sacrifice of personality occurs to maintain the good spirit of discourse, and to 
limit confrontations: “When two people of totally different natures are conversing, almost 
everything said by the one will, in a greater or less degree, displease the other” (24). According 
to his views, involving oneself in society requires deference in order to prevent such natural 
confrontation. Therefore, authenticity and one’s natural state of mind is only available in 
solitude, and is incompatible with friendship and social conversation. He claims, “That 
genuine, profound peace of mind, that perfect tranquility of soul, which, next to health, is the 
highest blessing earth can give, is to be attained only in solitude” (16). The genuine state of 
tranquility the philosopher speaks about becomes entirely compromised in social life, as it 
often requires pretense and denial of one’s true self in order to limit the displeasure of 
conflicting viewpoints. On Schopenhauer’s view, one who frequently engages with others is 
limiting one’s capacity for self-reflection, because constantly having to adapt one’s personality 
in order to create a more appealing and relatable discussion obscures one from one’s true self. 
Schopenhauer views solitude as the only source of personal development, rendering one’s 
social life as anything but genuine.   
While offering a pessimistic perspective of conformity to a largely inferior majority, 
Schopenhauer’s claims fail to acknowledge friendship’s short and long-term emotional 
benefits. Whether engaging in discussion with others is an authentic reflection of one’s true 
values or not, friendship stimulates an emotional connection with others that supports one’s 
mental health. Having a true friendship with another in the spirit of goodwill creates a positive 
sense of cheer and happiness between two people, whose effects are largely underestimated in 
Schopenhauer’s argument. These short term, day to day moments of pleasure derived from a 
compassionate friendship can provide a more positive outlook on one’s daily struggles, and 
therefore can influence one to be in good spirits for extended periods of time. This extended 
period of happiness can influence one to make more thought-out decisions and judgments, 
and therefore live a more satisfying, and virtuous life. Having a true friend can also lessen the 
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pain of misfortune brought onto a person through life’s endeavors, and can offer a supportive 
sensation of comfort in times of hardship.  
Roman philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero explains this emotional benefit in his 
treatise ​On Friendship.​ He argues that “misfortunes would be hard to bear if there were not 
someone to feel them even more acutely than yourself,” and so “friendship enhances 
prosperity, and relieves adversity of its burden by halving and sharing it” (Cicero: 8). Cicero 
here explains that a friend can lessen the burden of despair, and can act as an emotional 
support system to one who may feel isolated in times of need. This emotional comfort fostered 
by true friendship is largely disregarded by Schopenhauer, and displays an argument for the 
delight of emotional confidence adopted by one’s true friend. Having confidence with another 
limits the pain of hardship and can highlight moments of bliss and joy. Being able to share life’s 
periods of positivity with a friend you bond with can increase those periods’ influence on one’s 
long term prospects of emotional health. The impact of friends on one’s mental health is 
largely ignored by Schopenhauer in his criticism on social discourse, and it presents a view of a 
more pleasant perspective that encourages a more pleasant daily life. 
Cicero also introduces the idea that a true friendship creates a second self to 
compensate for what one lacks. When one becomes friends with another, Cicero explains, 
both mutually benefit from each other’s virtues and personal strengths. He claims that people 
vary in their positive traits, and friendship provides an avenue for one to benefit from the 
virtues of others, and traits that they lack. One’s friend becomes a continuation of a person’s 
qualities, and the friendship acts as a positive force of fulfillment, rather than an inauthentic 
compromise of one’s true self. Cicero puts its this way “In the face of a true friend a man sees 
as it were a second self. So that where his friend is he is; if his friend be rich, he is not poor, 
though he be weak, his friend's strength is his” (Cicero: 8).  
Having a second self that completes many of one’s shortcomings and insecurities 
elevates friendship’s virtue beyond Schopenhauer’s understanding of the impossibility of 
people benefitting from one another. Cicero contrasts Schopenhauer completely here, 
claiming that not only can people benefit from one another, but the mutual respect and 
affection gained from friendship is essential to the livelihood of society as we know it. He 
claims that, “if you eliminate from nature the tie of affection, there will be an end of house and 
city, nor will so much as the cultivation of the soil be left” (Cicero: 8). Cicero considers the 
affection of friendship to be the glue that incentivizes people to pursue the greater good, and 
not, as Schopenhauer views it, an inauthentic limitation of one’s self-development. Contrary 
to Schopenhauer, Cicero associates friendship with a form of moral, mental, and emotional 
support to an individual, and is essential to sustaining positivity in the world. Isolation—the 
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central alternative Schopenhauer proposes to better one’s self—limits a person in Cicero’s eyes, 
preventing them from benefiting from mutual goodwill.  
In response to Cicero’s proposed objections, Schopenhauer would claim that the 
emotional support a friend could provide, and the fulfillment of their role as a second self 
would eventually be undone by inevitable discord. The philosopher asserts that even those of 
identical intellectual virtue experience discord that can lead to a friendship’s demise. The 
emotional benefit Cicero cites as beneficial in the short and long run, Schopenhauer views as 
erratic, variable, and not worth the trouble. He claims that it would provide more heartache 
than pleasure, and these erratic emotions are better forgone rather than labored over on a daily 
basis. One’s mood in the short term can create tensions between two friends, as Schopenhauer 
explains, “You will hardly ever see two people exactly in the same frame of mind… These 
differences give rise to discord between persons of the most harmonious disposition” 
(Schopenhauer: 24). He contends that due to the variety of issues in people’s lives, a difference 
in their frame of mind creates a clash of opinions and short-term viewpoints. These differing 
opinions take a central role in one’s memory, and, “explains why it is that memory always... 
transfigures, the attitude we have taken up at any period of the past” (24). He describes 
friendship as fickle and destined to fade due to the difference in mood or long-term frame of 
mind between two individuals of equal intelligence. Friends often cease to forget moments of 
discord between one another, and as tensions grow the will to benefit from each other’s 
company naturally diminishes, and the friendship naturally fades. Schopenhauer concludes 
here that the inevitable discord that will occur between two friends is not worth the trouble in 
the long run, and any emotional gratification one receives from companionship offers nothing 
permanent to their human development. Thus, regardless of the comfort friendship provides a 
person, he concludes that the energy spent on the heartache from the eventual conflict 
between friends is better spent on developing oneself in isolation. 
While Schopenhauer’s response to Cicero’s claims cites eventual conflict as a reason to 
forego friendship, Cicero’s exploration of virtue as a root of friendship undermines the 
inevitability of discord. He claims that the virtues of both involved develop and improve in an 
affectionate relationship, and that disagreement between friends is a point of growth, not 
discord. Genuine loving friendship stems from two people appreciating the virtues in one 
another, and Cicero views this love as being driven by one’s integrity: “For nothing inspires 
love, nothing conciliates affection, like virtue” (Cicero: 10). Those who appreciate virtue 
benefit from the disagreements among friends, as it “enhances prosperity” , and evaluates their 
respective qualities. This evaluation beneficial for both.  
Additionally, Cicero views genuine friendship as a natural inclination to better oneself, 
and due to human beings’ natural instinct to better themselves and develop their values, the 
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natural desire to appreciate a friend’s positive traits is a beneficial, and more importantly, 
genuine instinct. Cicero maintains that “Friendship springs from a natural impulse rather than 
a wish for help: from an inclination of the heart, combined with a certain instinctive feeling of 
love, rather than from a deliberate calculation of the material advantage it was likely to confer” 
(10). This natural impulse is driven by those of high moral standing, and not of those seeking 
friendship for personal benefit. He further disproves Schopenhauer’s theory by claiming that, 
“When a man’s confidence in himself is greatest, when he is so fortified by virtue and wisdom 
as to want nothing and to feel absolutely self-dependent, it is then that he is most conspicuous 
for seeking out and keeping up friendships” (Cicero 12). Cicero maintains that those who 
engage in friendship do so out of natural urges to share their virtue with others, and benefit 
from those of similar stature. The discord Schopenhauer cites may be inevitable, yet serves 
more as a point of positive development between two honorable people, and not discourse 
that should be avoided altogether.  
Arthur Schopenhauer’s conclusion that friendship and social discourse play a negative 
influence on people’s lives offers a distinct viewpoint on their limits, yet ultimately fails to 
recognize a key aspect of friendship. The emotional satisfaction and support gained from one’s 
friends offers an invaluable coping mechanism to many suffering from hardship. A friend’s 
role as one’s second self fosters a mutual benefit that runs counter to Schopenhauer’s claims. 
Thus, Schopenhauer’s conclusions on social discourse fundamentally lack an emotional 
perspective that counteracts much of his discourse on pessimism. His argument that 
friendships inevitably fall apart seems misconstrued, as the personal virtues of friends 
incentivize them to benefit from disagreement, and grow their moral standing. Cicero’s views 
on the benefits of social interaction act as an offset to the constant striving, as those who 
receive emotional satisfaction from their friends essentially break the cycle of striving. Despite 
Schopenhauer’s commitment to pessimism throughout his writings over the course of his life, 
perhaps his caveats on isolation’s downsides offer some acknowledgement of the necessity of 
human interaction for the sustainability of civilizations worldwide. Social interaction drives 
people’s prosperity, and as Cicero declares, is a defining aspect of the world’s advancement; 
“Fire and water themselves, to use a common expression, are not of more universal use than 
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